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Abstract
Economic voting is one of themost studied aspects of electoral behaviour. The dominant view is that sociotropic economic
considerations aremore important to voters in national elections. However, other research suggests that utilitarianmotiva-
tions are key to understanding support for the EU. An EU integration referendumoffers the opportunity to explorewhether
and when sociotropic or utilitarian motivations are more important in determining vote choice. The unusual combination
of two successive referendums in Ireland on the Lisbon Treaty, either side of the Global Financial Crisis, provides the ideal
opportunity to test these assumptions. Using data from two post-referendum surveys, we demonstrate that the economy
mattered in both referendums but that different economic motivations drove vote choice in each, with sociotropic motiva-
tionsmore critical as a result of the Global Financial Crisis. Our study has implications for economic voting and referendums
and demonstrates that context is crucial in determining a voter’s economic motivations in a plebiscite.
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1. Introduction
The use of plebiscites to decide matters of public pol-
icy in established democracies, even in states with a tra-
dition of representative democracy, has been growing
(Bjørklund, 2009; LeDuc, 2002b) to such an extent that
‘one is tempted to say that we live in the age of ref-
erendums’ (Qvortrup, 2018, p. 7). Their increased use
has stimulated research into understanding what moti-
vates voters to vote in a particular way in plebiscites.
Multiple explanations have emerged. Second-order the-
ories suggest their outcome in large part hinge on
an incumbent government’s popularity (Franklin, 2002;
Franklin, Marsh, & Wleizen, 1994; van der Eijk, Franklin,
& Marsh, 1996). Other research highlights the impor-
tance of referendum campaigns (Darcy & Laver, 1990;
Pammett & LeDuc, 2001; Quinlan, 2012), knowledge
among voters of the plebiscite issue and where polit-
ical elites stand on the issue (Elkink & Sinnott, 2015;
Hobolt, 2005, 2009) and voter attitudes on particular
issues, for example, identity, or immigration, or in EU
referendums sentiments regarding European integration
(Clarke, Goodwin, & Whiteley, 2017; Garry, Marsh, &
Sinnott, 2005; Hooghe & Marks, 2004; McLaren, 2002;
Svensson, 2002). Another school of thought focuses on
utilitarian benefits or costs expected to accrue from vot-
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ing in a particular way in a referendum (Clarke et al.,
2017; Gabel, 1998a, 1998b; Hobolt & de Vries, 2016;
Nadeau,Martin, & Blais, 1999). Our contribution fits into
this tradition as we dissect the impact of different eco-
nomic motivations on vote choice in two Irish EU refer-
endums on the same issue with the same government in
situ but held in two dramatically different contexts.
Our interest lies in disentangling the different eco-
nomicmotivations, namely sociotropic versus egocentric
utility. Our starting point is the extensive literature that
has developed in the past two decades highlighting ‘win-
ners’ from ‘losers’ of globalization (Gabel, 1998b; Gabel
& Whitten, 1997; Kriesi et al., 2008; Teney, Lacewell,
& De Wilde, 2014). Cross-cutting traditional economic
left-right and conservative-liberal dimensions of political
division, ‘winners’ include middle-class left-wing voters
with cosmopolitan values and liberal right-wing voters
favouring international liberalization and free trade. Con-
versely, losers include working-class voters with both tra-
ditional left-wing values and those resorting to a stronger
anti-immigration, more right-wing perspective (Teney
et al., 2014). Studies of EU plebiscites and EU integration
have investigated this research strand empirically by us-
ing both objective proxies for ‘winner’ and ‘loser’ status
(Gabel, 1998a, 1998b; Rose & Borz, 2016) and using sub-
jective self-perception measures of an individual’s per-
sonal economic situation (e.g., Clarke et al., 2017; Gabel
&Whitten, 1997).While the evidence for utilitarianmoti-
vations shaping attitudes to European integration is plen-
tiful, there is much less support for the utilitarian logic
in shaping vote choice in elections. From the economic
voting perspective, sociotropic motivations—an altruis-
tic drive—are a significantly more potent driver of the
voter vis-à-vis utilitarian motivations (Anderson, 2000;
Kiewiet & Lewis-Beck, 2011; Kinder & Kiewiet, 1979;
Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2013). Nonetheless, the impact
of sociotropic motivations on support for European in-
tegration have been mixed (Eichenberg & Dalton, 2007;
Gomez, 2015; Hobolt & de Vries, 2016). Hence, we are
confronted with a puzzle that different economic moti-
vations appear to be more important in shaping towards
EU integration compared to the electoral arena. An EU
integration referendum brings both these dimensions to-
gether and thus our interest lies in disentangling which
is more important in driving the vote.
However, the role of context is also important.
A plethora of literature has implied that the impact of
economicmotivations on the vote varies cross-nationally
and depends on economic circumstances. Moreover,
the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) brought economics to
the forefront of the political agenda and research has
shown that economics not only becamemore salient but
also a significant predictor of vote choice in elections
(Dassonneville & Lewis-Beck, 2014; Singer, 2011; Talving,
2017). Its impact on referendum voting behaviour is
much less known. Additionally, the GFC has sparked
an increase in the literature on economic motivations
and support for the European project (Bartkowska &
Tiemann, 2015; Gomez, 2015; Hobolt & de Vries, 2016).
Yet, most of this research has not been from the perspec-
tive of the electoral arena. Literature exists implying that
given this strength, variations in different motivations
underlying economic voting—egocentric or sociotropic,
utilitarian or altruistic—will be more starkly separable
(Bartkowska & Tiemann, 2015). In sum, our article’s mis-
sion is to explore not only whether utilitarian or altruis-
tic motives shape vote choice in referendums but also to
explore whether differing economic contexts (pre- and
post-GFC) shape voters’ motivations in EU referendums.
Our study relies on data from two post-referendum
surveys in Ireland on the Lisbon Treaty. Ireland offers
an ideal testing ground for testing our assumptions re-
garding voting behaviour in EU plebiscites as it is a po-
litical imperative, if not a constitutional requirement, to
hold a referendum on matters related to EU integration
(Sinnott, 2005). As a result, Ireland has had more EU ref-
erendums than any other member state. The combina-
tion of two referendums in Ireland on the Lisbon Treaty
either side of the onset of the GFC provides a unique op-
portunity to explore the impact of the economy in EU ref-
erendums where the same Treaty is being voted upon, in
the same country, with the same government in situ, but
crucially where the economic context between the two
plebiscites is dramatically different. At the time of the
first vote in June 2008, there appeared to be high con-
fidence in Ireland’s economic position with unemploy-
ment low, Ireland’s fiscal position apparently sound, and
voter confidence in the economy mostly positive. How-
ever, by the time of the second referendum in October
2009, the full impact of the GFC on Ireland was becom-
ing apparent (Quinlan, 2012). A focus on EU referendums
is also timely given their global implications beyond the
state and, more recently, in light of Brexit.
We show that voters’ economicmotivations were dif-
ferent between 2008 and 2009. In 2008, voters were mo-
tivated by both utilitarian and sociotropic concerns, be-
ing more likely to have voted ‘yes’ when they felt their
personal finances were good, when it was in their socio-
demographic economic determined interests and if they
felt the Treaty was good for Ireland’s economymore gen-
erally. However, in 2009, the situation changed. While
objective measures of the utilitarian model, such as so-
cial class and education, continued to impact voting be-
haviour, offering support to the theory, we find no ev-
idence that subjective utilitarian measures mattered in
2009 after the onset of the GFC. Rather, voters focused
on the national picture, with sociotropic concerns key,
and voters substantially more likely to vote ‘yes’ in the
expectation of an improvement in Ireland’s economic
prospects by doing so. Our results imply that sociotropic
motivations are consistently important in shaping the
vote in EU referendums despite the context, whereas the
importance of utilitarianmotives varies more so depend-
ing on the context.
Our article proceeds as follows: first, we outline our
hypotheseswithin the literature on economic voting,mo-
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tivators of support for EU integration and voting in EU
referendums. To put the analysis in context, we then pro-
vide a summary of the political and economic landscape
in which the referendums took place, followed by our
data and empirical analysis and discussion.
2. Voters’ Economic Motivations in Referendums
2.1. Economic Voting in Referendums: State of the Art
‘It’s the economy, stupid!’ the phrase coined by Bill
Clinton’s campaign team during his presidential run of
1992 captures the importance that economic assess-
ments can have on voter behaviour. Numerous studies
have confirmed its impact in various types of elections
(Lewis-Beck, 1988; Lewis-Beck, Nadeau, & Elias, 2008;
Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2013; Okolikj & Quinlan, 2016).
In studies of referendums, economics has been found to
be influential in high stakes plebiscites such as those deal-
ing with constitutional change and succession in Canada
and Scotland (Clarke, Kornberg, & Stewart, 2004; Curtice,
2014; Nadeau et al., 1999). In EU referendums, voters’
economic considerations were especially important in
the swathe of accession referendums in the early 2000s
(Doyle & Fidirmuc, 2006; Tverdova & Anderson, 2004)
and in votes on specific EU treaties or issues (Aylott,
2005; Jupille & Leblang, 2007) and more recently in ac-
counting for vote choice in Britain’s plebiscite on exiting
the EU (Clarke et al., 2017). However, much of the exist-
ing research on EU referendums has been dominated by
the ‘second-order’ (Franklin, 2002; Franklin et al., 1994)
and ‘issue-voting’ models (Garry et al., 2005; Svensson,
2002), with the economy either gaining less attention, or
when it has been the focus, being inter-linked with gov-
ernment popularity and thus subsumed under second-
order explanations.1 There is also cause to assume that
the effect of the economy on support for EU integration
increased more generally given the extent of economic
control that has been delegated to the EU, especially for
Eurozone countries. In sum, there is strong reason to as-
sume that economics, be it at themacro or the individual
level, will shape vote choice in EU referendums.
Two things are less clear, however. First, what eco-
nomic motivations drive vote choice in EU plebiscites?
On the one hand, the literature on European integration
strongly highlights the role of utilitarian economic consid-
erations, that is a focus on self-interest, in determining
support for the EU (Eichenberg & Dalton, 2007; Gabel,
1998a, 1998b; Gomez, 2015; Hobolt & de Vries, 2016),
thus implying that we might expect this to translate into
egocentric motivations determining the vote. However,
we are faced with a paradox. While the aforementioned
literature shows a correlation between egocentric mo-
tivations and support for the EU, there has been much
less empirical support found for egocentric voting in na-
tional elections (Kiewiet, 1983; Lewis-Beck, 1988; Lewis-
Beck, Stubager, & Nadeau, 2013), at least in comparison
to the sociotropic model, where voters take a wider ap-
proach and focus on national level circumstances as op-
posed to personal ones.2 Hence, our contribution’s first
objective is to tease out the impacts of these different
motivations on vote choice in EU referendums. Second,
what is the role of context in conditioning the economic
motivations of the voter in a referendum? A long tradi-
tion of research in the economic voting field has shown
that context is crucial in determining how the economy
shapes the vote from institutional configurations to the
economic conditions voters are faced with (Anderson,
2000; Okolikj & Quinlan, 2016; Powell & Whitten, 1993).
And while the GFC has spawned several studies of the
economy’s impact on vote and support for the EU, there
has been scant exploration of how the economic condi-
tions of the GFC influenced referendum voting (an excep-
tion is Clarke et al., 2017, and the Brexit referendum)
or specifically how it conditioned voter economic mo-
tivations. Consequently, our second objective is to test
whether economic voting calculus altered because of the
GFC. Below, we develop our expectations.
2.2. Egocentric and Sociotropic Economic Motivations in
EU Referendums and the Role of Context
As we mentioned above, the literature on economic vot-
ing has highlighted two different motivations: egocen-
tric and sociotropic. To recapitulate the egocentric vot-
ing premise: it is a self-interested utilitarian response to
the evaluation of the economy, where the voter looks pri-
marily at his or her own economic situation (Melzer &
Richard, 1981; Nannestad & Paldam, 1995, 1997). While
the support for the hypothesis in the economic voting
literature is minimal, in the context of support for EU in-
tegration the egocentric model has been especially suc-
cessful in accounting for attitudes to the EU. The ego-
centric premise, at least regarding support for integra-
tion, can be looked at from two standpoints. The first is
by exploring the objective socio-demographic character-
istics of voters as proxy tests regarding their vulnerabil-
ity to globalization. Advanced primarily by Gabel (1998a,
1998b), this approach posits that the economic advan-
tages or disadvantages of EU integration will be differ-
ent for particular social groups. For example, the bene-
fits of the types of economic policies being advanced by
the EU are more likely to be reaped by a young highly
educated middle class professional who is in a better po-
1 In addition to the second-order voting model, one might also expect party cues to play an important role in these referendums (cf. Hicks, Milner, &
Tingley, 2014). However, in the Irish case, a consensus on the EU has effectively existed between the main political parties, who were all broadly sup-
portive of the notion of European integration. Consequently, Europe has not been a pivotal issue in Irish politics and receives little attention from the
main parties outside EU referendums. This de facto ‘elite withdrawal’, whether by accident or design, has been pointed out by many scholars exploring
Irish referendum voting behaviour (Darcy & Laver, 1990; O’Mahony, 2009; Quinlan, 2012) and thus we would not expect partisan cues to be a strong
feature in Irish referendums. We do investigate party cues as a robustness check in the Appendix in Table A2.
2 Although for alternative evidence see Nannestad and Paldam (1997).
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sition to take advantage of market liberalization and the
opportunities to travel, study abroad, etcetera, than by
a middle-aged, low skilled labourer, who faces stronger
employment competition from cheaper labour in new
member states (Gabel, 1998a, 1998b; Gabel & Palmer,
1995). Some scholars go so far as to argue that the onset
of globalization has resulted in a new dimension of polit-
ical contestation taking prominence in domestic politics
of several states, with attitudes towards the EU, which
by its very nature is a global institution committed to a
free-market agenda, being a critical point of difference
between political actors, cross-cutting traditional cleav-
ages (Kriesi et al., 2008; Teney et al., 2014).
As the Lisbon referendums in Ireland were integra-
tionist, wemight assume that the expectations advanced
by Gabel regarding general support for the EU translate
into how certain groups behave at the ballot box. To
test the Gabel egocentric model, we look at the socio-
demographic groups that aremost likely to be the ‘losers’
from globalization. Accordingly, wemight expect citizens
who areworking-class, individuals towards the bottomof
the income scale, older voters and less educated voters,
both of whom are less likely to be beneficiaries of eco-
nomic globalization, being less likely to support further
integration efforts.
Consequently, we posit that:
Hypothesis 1a:Middle-class voters will have a greater
likelihood of voting ‘yes’ comparedwithworking-class
voters in the Lisbon referendums.
Hypothesis 1b: Highly educated voters will have a
greater likelihood of voting ‘yes’ compared with less
educated voters in the Lisbon referendums.
Hypothesis 1c: Younger voters will have a greater like-
lihood of voting ‘yes’ compared with older voters in
the Lisbon referendums.
Testing utilitarian economic motivations does not end
there. Our second means of doing so is the more con-
ventional test of egocentric motivations, at least in the
economic voting literature. This is wherewe explore how
individuals perceive EU integration has influenced their
personal financial situation. The idea is that voters who
believe further integration or membership of the EU has
been beneficial to them will be more amenable to fur-
ther European integration. Consequently, in terms of ref-
erendum voting, we should see this translate into voting
for the integrationist position. In our analysis, we take
a retrospective evaluation of the personal economic sit-
uation as a proxy measure for this perception (see also
Tucker, Pacek, & Berinsky, 2002).
Hypothesis 2: Voters who are satisfied with their per-
sonal financial situation compared with voters who
are dissatisfied will have a greater likelihood of voting
‘yes’ in the Lisbon referendums.
The most prominent economic evaluations in shaping
vote choice have been sociotropic (e.g., Anderson, 2000;
Lewis-Beck, 1988; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000, 2013).
In this scenario, voters do not focus on personal circum-
stances but rather the economic benefits or losses that
accrue to the national economy. In the context of an
EU referendum, this would be economic benefits that
accrue to the country as a consequence of EU integra-
tion. For example, voters may decide to vote ‘yes’ on
the basis that support for the Treaty will result in more
jobs coming to Ireland. In fact, one could argue that a
panic factor is engendered by a crisis and that this re-
sults in individuals who had a severe anxiety about their
economic situation becoming more likely to support in-
tegration. If this is the case, respondents who feel their
personal economic situation is bad or segments of the
population such as working-class voters are likely to sup-
port further integration in times of crisis, but it will also
translate into a more general concern about the way the
economy is managed and thus to sociotropic economic
voting behaviour.
Hypothesis 3: Voters who believe Ireland’s economic
situation will improve as a consequence of further in-
tegration will have a greater likelihood of voting ‘yes’
in the Lisbon referendums.
All of our above suppositions have been focusing on
the first research question concerning how we expect
economic motivations to play out in referendum voting.
However, our second question assumes context plays a
role too. There is good cause to suspect that motivations
could be conditional on the context voters face—both
the direction and the magnitude of the effect. Between
the two Lisbon referendums in Ireland, there was a sub-
stantial change in the economic conditions voters were
facedwith (see Section 3 for details). Howmight this play
into referendum voting? Our supposition is that in an
economic crisis, the economy takes on a greater saliency
as information about the economy becomes more acces-
sible to voters (Singer, 2011), the media gives greater
coverage to the issue (Soroka, 2006), and voters tend
to be particularly responsive to negative economic infor-
mation (Dassonneville & Lewis-Beck, 2014). Similarly, we
might expect the referendum campaign in a time of eco-
nomic crisis to be different to that of a campaign fought
in a period of relative economic calm,withmore focus on
the national economy. As campaigns have been shown
to be important in referendums in particular (LeDuc,
2002a), especially those where the partisan configura-
tion is unconventional (LeDuc, 2015), we can expect this
to significantly affect voter attitudes. Hence, with the on-
set of the GFC and the sense of ’panic’ instilled on vot-
ers through this rhetoric, we expect sociotropic evalua-
tions to be more prominent in determining the vote in
2009 than in times of prosperity, in the 2008 referendum.
Hence, we assume that:
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Hypothesis 4: Sociotropic economic motivations com-
pared with egocentric economic motivations will be
stronger and thus have a greater impact on the likeli-
hood of voting ‘yes’ in the 2009 Lisbon referendum.
3. The Economic Context and the Two Lisbon
Referendum Campaigns in Ireland
As one of our contributions focuses on the impact of eco-
nomic conditions on voters’ economicmotivations, some
context regarding Ireland and the two referendums is
warranted. The first referendum on the Lisbon Treaty in
Irelandwas held in June 2008,where Irish voters rejected
it by a margin of 53–47% (for more on the 2008 refer-
endum, see Quinlan, 2009). While several factors con-
tributed to this rejection (Sinnott, Elkink, O’Rourke, &
McBride,2009; Quinlan, 2009, for a summary) our inter-
est is in the economic conditions voters were confronted
with at the time of this first vote. At face value, the Irish
economy appeared to be doingwell: unemployment was
at 6%, below the EU average, economic growth for 2008
was still being forecast, and the nation’s fiscal position
appeared to be steady. Irish voters also seemed to be
blissfully unaware of the economic tsunami that would
hit the country later in 2008, with aMillward Brown/IMS
opinion poll finding that 69% of Irish people described
their economic situation as ‘good’ at the time of the 2008
vote (Quinlan, 2009). While the economy did feature as
an issue in the first referendum campaign, the argument
focused on the impact of the Treaty on Ireland’s tax pol-
icy (Quinlan, 2009, p. 110). In sum, the 2008 referen-
dum was held in an atmosphere where economic con-
ditions, at least on the surface, appeared to be positive,
and where the economy, particularly from a sociotropic
perspective was not centre stage during the campaign.
However, the period between the first plebiscite and
the second Lisbon referendum in October 2009 saw Ire-
land’s economic landscape radically change, as the coun-
try endured its biggest economic downturn in its history.
The GFC had serious implications for Ireland, due to the
small and open nature of its economy. In autumn 2008
the Irish economy slid into recession for the first time
since 1983 as the subprimemortgage crisis in the United
States had global implications for banks and their abil-
ity to lend. This impact was further exacerbated because
the Irish economy had become grossly over-reliant on
the property and construction sectors during the eco-
nomic boom years of the Celtic Tiger. Ireland’s banks
had engaged in large-scale property-related lending re-
sulting in their balance sheets growing disproportionally
large relative to the size of the economy. Consequently,
Irish banks were hit particularly badly as the GFC took
root. In September 2008, on the verge of insolvency, the
government stepped in and guaranteed all Irish bank li-
abilities and recapitalised them using public funds. The
Fianna Fail/Green government also controversially es-
tablished the National Assets Management Agency, es-
sentially a ‘bad bank’ which acquired property develop-
ment loans from the banks in return for government debt
bonds, all with the aim of restoring confidence to a bank-
ing system that seriously lacked credibility. All of this
put a significant strain on Ireland’s finances, already suf-
fering from declining revenues with the collapse of the
housing and construction booms. Between the two ref-
erendums, unemployment rose sharply, from 6 to 13%,
and Ireland’s debt to GDP ratio increased substantially
(Central StatisticsOffice, 2010a, 2010b). The government
responded by introducing two austere budgets within
6 months, which saw sharp tax rises and substantial
cuts in public expenditure. In the 17-month period be-
tween the first and second referendums, the country’s
economic decline was unprecedented as GDP fell by be-
tween 11 and 12% in the first three quarters of 2009
(Central Statistics Office, 2010a). Voter confidence in the
economy also tanked (Sinnott & Elkink, 2010), while gov-
ernment popularity plummeted, with the ruling coalition
parties, Fianna Fail and the Green suffering an electoral
shellacking in the June 2009 European and local govern-
ment elections (Quinlan, 2010).
These changed economic circumstances saw the sec-
ond referendum campaign dominated by the economy
(for more detail on the second referendum, see Quinlan,
2012). Those advocating a ‘yes’ vote linked Ireland’s fu-
ture economic success to membership of the EU, mak-
ing economic recovery and employment central planks
of their campaign. The ‘no’ side countered that support-
ers of the Treaty were playing on peoples’ economic
anxieties and urged voters to use the referendum as
an opportunity to punish the government for their han-
dling of the economy. Consequently, the economy was
far more central to the 2009 referendum than to the
2008 campaign.
While the economic conditions represented themost
seismic changes between the two referendums, two
other conditions merit mention. The first was the pro-
curement by the Irish government of legal guarantees in
June 2009 stating the Lisbon Treaty in no way affected
Irish tax policy or the country’s neutrality, and abor-
tion policy, with concern over these issues in the first
vote having increased the likelihood of people voting ‘no’
(Sinnott et al., 2009). Hence, these guarantees reduced
the saliency of these issues in the second referendum.
Second, the campaigns waged by protagonists on both
sides changed considerably. While the ‘yes’ campaign in
the first referendum was of poor quality (Quinlan, 2012,
p. 143), in 2009 it was the more active and cohesive of
the two campaigns. It received the support of the influ-
ential Irish Farming Association (IFA) early on in the cam-
paign, (whereas in 2008 the IFA had been a late con-
vert to the ’yes’ side), and the country’s largest trade
union, Services, Industrial, Professional and Technical
Union, which had remained neutral in 2008. Meanwhile,
the ‘no’ side’s main protagonist in the 2008 plebiscite,
Libertas, had lost much of its political impetus by 2009
after its defeat in the 2009 European elections (Quinlan,
2012, p. 145).
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In sum, while it is evident that the legal guarantees
and the campaigns represent two additional changed
conditions between Lisbon I and Lisbon II, the primary
contextual difference between 2008 and 2009 was that
voters faced dramatically different economic conditions.
Indeed, it could be argued that the more intense cam-
paigning on the part of the ‘yes’ side, including the sup-
port of the unions and the farmers, was driven by these
circumstances. We posit that the shift in economic con-
ditions were the starkest and most important change.
Moreover, despite the legal guarantees provided to the
Irish government, we should not lose sight that voters
voted upon the exact sameTreaty in both plebisciteswith
not one word of the Lisbon Treaty altered because of the
first rejection.
4. Research Strategy
4.1. Data
Our data comes from two post-referendum surveys: the
first fielded between 24 and 31 July 2008, two weeks
after the June 2008 vote, and the second between
20 and 23 November 2009, six weeks after the Octo-
ber 2009 plebiscite. These data were commissioned by
the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, in collaboration
with an independent polling company, Millward Brown
Lansdowne. The face-to-face surveys had sample sizes of
2,101 and 1,002 respondents, respectively, and were de-
signed to be representative of all persons eligible to vote.
Quotaswere set according to the 2006 Irish census based
on region, sex, age, and socio-economic group.
4.2. Modelling Strategy and Variable Operationalization
It is common in the analysis of referendums to investi-
gate the decision to vote or abstain and whether the
individual voted ‘yes’ or ‘no’ separately. While we per-
form these tests for robustness, our analysis is based on
an integration of these two steps in one logistic model.
We employ this strategy because of the inherent inter-
dependence between the two behaviours. The decision
whether or not to vote can be expected to be influenced
by how strongly a voter feels about the referendum is-
sue, such that the utility attached to a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ out-
come not only influences vote choice, but also turnout.
Our model follows that of Sattler and Urpelainen (2012),
which is the referendumequivalent to the two-candidate
election model developed in Sanders (1998). In these
models, a latent utility of a ‘yes’ vote is interpreted in a
number of different, compatible ways: a) a positive value
indicates a propensity to vote ‘yes’; b) a negative value in-
dicates a propensity to vote ‘no’; c) the absolute value in-
dicates how strongly one feels about this preference; and
d) the stronger one’s preference, the more likely one is
to vote despite the cost of doing so.3 This model implies
that voters consider the utilities of a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ prior
to their decision whether or not to participate in the ref-
erendum: those with a strong opinion regarding the ref-
erendum outcome will be more likely to vote. Some ex-
planations of turnout, such as those referring to a sense
of duty to vote or levels of apathy towards the political
system, precede the vote choice decision such that those
who do not feel compelled to vote will also not evaluate
the relative utilities of either vote outcome. Our mod-
elling approach assumes that these factors capture the
cost component of the model.
Turning to the survey questions and operationaliza-
tions of our variables, our sociotropic measure is based
on a question that looks at people’s expectations regard-
ing Ireland’s economic prospects given a ‘yes’ vote. Re-
spondents were asked in 2008: ‘Do you think that, as
a result of the ‘NO’ vote in the Lisbon Treaty referen-
dum, Ireland’s economic prospects have been improved
or disimproved or remain unchanged?’, and in 2009: ‘Do
you think that, as a result of the ‘YES’ vote in the Lisbon
Treaty referendum, Ireland’s economic prospects have
been improved or disimproved or remain unchanged?’
This diverges somewhat from the traditional sociotropic
economy question as the formulation of the question
assumes a more conscious linkage in the respondent’s
mind between the vote and the economic consequences
of the Treaty, which might result in the sociotropic effect
being underestimated, as it is conceivable that citizens
might unconsciously vote based on general expectations
not implicitly tied up with the Treaty. Given the finding
by Dassonneville and Lewis-Beck (2014) that a negative
change in the economy has a much stronger effect on so-
ciotropic voting than a positive change in the economy,
we separately include a dummy variable for expecting im-
proved economic prospects due to a ‘yes’ vote and one
for expecting worsened economic prospects.
We tap utilitarian economic voting in two different
ways. The first is the conventional egocentric measure
which asks respondents to evaluate their personal eco-
nomic situation. We capture this through respondents’
answer to the following question: ‘What about your own
economic situation these days? Would you say it is very
good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad?’ Again, this
question slightly deviates from the traditional measure
which is more explicitly retrospective or prospective and
usually imposes a time limit. Hence, the asymmetry be-
tween the sociotropic and egocentric measure and the
Treaty being voted upon needs to be considered a caveat
to our findings. Moreover, we recognize that some ques-
tion whether voter perceptions of economic circum-
stances, be they egocentric or sociotropic, are heavily
contaminated by partisan bias (Evans & Anderson, 2006;
Wlezien, Franklin, & Twiggs, 1997). However, persuasive
evidence exists showing economics has a direct effect on
vote, and if anything, cross-sectional analysis may sup-
press the true impact of economic voting (Fraile & Lewis-
Beck, 2014; Lewis-Beck et al., 2008). In any event, our
second measures, in the vein of Gabel (1998a, 1998b),
3 See Sattler and Urpelainen (2012) for the technical details and the resulting log-likelihood function.
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circumvent the endogeneity critique and capture the be-
haviour of various socio-demographic groups (class, ed-
ucation, and age) to assess if utilitarian motivations are
being channelled through an individual’s socio-economic
circumstances. While our focus is on the economy, we in-
clude covariates reflecting several alternative theoretical
explanations of vote choice in EU referendums.4
5. Results
Table 1 presents the results for Hypotheses 1a–c based
on demographic variables where attitudinal variables
would be inappropriate controls. Based on these mea-
sures it is clear that the utilitarian argument regarding
different groups favouring EU integration holds across
both Lisbon referendums. Working class voters are sig-
nificantly less likely to vote ‘yes’ than middle class voters
(H1a)—although the classification between ‘unskilled’
and ‘skilled’ does not appear to make much difference.
Those with higher levels of education are more likely to
vote ‘yes’ (H 1b).5 These effects persist with similar mag-
nitude across the two referendums, despite the onset of
the GFC. However, the effect on the different age groups
is contrary to that expected by the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’
hypothesis (H 1c). Instead, older voters were more likely
to vote ‘yes’ than younger voters.
Table 1. Logistic random utility regressions (Sattler & Urpelainen, 2012) explaining vote choice in the 2008 and 2009 Lisbon
referendums in Ireland, based on demographic variables.
2008 2009
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Cost Utility Cost Utility Cost Utility Cost Utility
Female −0.12 −0.12 −0.17 −0.16
(0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.12)
Age 18–24 1.06** −0.22 1.22** −0.38** 0.95** −0.43* 1.10** −0.65**
(0.13) (0.17) (0.14) (0.18) (0.22) (0.25) (0.23) (0.26)
Age 25–34 0.88** −0.35** 0.99** −0.46** 0.41* −0.36 0.52** −0.51**
(0.13) (0.15) (0.14) (0.16) (0.22) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23)
Age 35–49 0.45** −0.16 0.52** −0.24 −0.06 −0.42** 0.03 −0.54**
(0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.23) (0.21) (0.23) (0.22)
Age 50–64 0.13 −0.16 0.17 −0.20 −0.30 −0.18 −0.25 −0.25
(0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.25) (0.22) (0.25) (0.23)
Lower middle class 0.15 −0.33** 0.09 −0.27** −0.25 −0.49** −0.27 −0.44*
(0.12) (0.14) (0.12) (0.14) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
Skilled working class 0.33** −0.81** 0.17 −0.65** 0.08 −0.99** −0.04 −0.78**
(0.12) (0.14) (0.13) (0.15) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24)
Unskilled working class 0.55** −0.86** 0.38** −0.70** 0.11 −0.99** −0.05 −0.76**
(0.12) (0.15) (0.13) (0.16) (0.22) (0.22) (0.23) (0.24)
Farmer −0.02 0.23 −0.16 −0.07 −0.34 −0.29 −0.46 −0.11
(0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.20) (0.36) (0.33) (0.37) (0.34)
Secondary education −0.08 0.09 −0.22 0.17
(0.14) (0.17) (0.22) (0.25)
Third level education −0.38** 0.35* −0.46* 0.57**
(0.15) (0.19) (0.26) (0.28)
Intercept −1.06** 0.50** −0.84** 0.28 −0.79** 1.53** −0.51* 1.20**
(0.15) (0.16) (0.18) (0.21) (0.26) (0.26) (0.31) (0.33)
N 2098 2098 997 997
AIC 4390.1 4378.0 2016.0 2011.3
Notes: * p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05. Standard errors in parentheses. Because of high collinearity between age, class, and education, models
are estimated with and without education included. Cost is modelled with a dummy for abstention as dependent variable; utility with
a dummy variable for a ‘yes’ vote as dependent variable.
4 Full details of the operationalizations of our variables and summary statistics are detailed in the Appendix.
5 Due to highmulticollinearity when age, class, and education are all three included, we present separatemodels with andwithout the education variable.
For Model 2, the highest Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is 4.65, while for Model 1 this is reduced to 2.27; for Model 4 the highest VIF is 5.01, reduced
to 2.26 in Model 3. Typically used threshold values for multicollinearity are VIF scores of 4, 6, or 10, and therefore there is no real concern with high
multicollinearity in our models (O’Brien, 2007). For the more extensive specification, models 5-8, education is always included, since the demographics
are mere control variables and therefore high multicollinearity among them is not a concern. The highest observed VIF score across all models is 5.25,
for education.
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Table 2 provides the tests of Hypotheses 2 and 3.
Here demographic variables are included as controls,
alongside other covariates related to government satis-
faction and political knowledge, and attitudes towards
identity and immigration. We present models with and
without attitudinal control variables. In models 5 and
6, which relate to the 2008 referendum and before the
GFC took root, we see an effect in line with H2. We ob-
serve that a negative evaluation of the voter’s personal
economic situation led voters to be more likely to reject
the Treaty. However, for 2009 (i.e., post the shock of the
GFC), this variable, presented inmodels 7 and 8, has a sta-
tistically insignificant, positive effect. This is an important
shift—voters’ personal economic security shaped vote
choice in 2008when the economic climatewasmore pos-
itive, whereas in 2009, these egocentric considerations
were much less relevant when the crisis was apparent.
It supports the proposition that context conditions the
economic vote and we can deduce support that the GFC
resulted in a shift in economic calculus among voters.
In line with H3, voters were strongly inclined to vote
‘yes’ by sociotropic utility—i.e., by the perception that
Table 2. Logistic random utility regressions (Sattler & Urpelainen, 2012) explaining vote choice in the 2008 and 2009 Lisbon
referendums in Ireland.
2008 2009
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Cost Utility Cost Utility Cost Utility Cost Utility
Female −0.06 −0.04 −0.09 −0.19
(0.10) (0.10) (0.15) (0.17)
Age 18–24 0.97** −0.39* 0.93** −0.35 0.66** −0.41 0.55** −0.71*
(0.15) (0.22) (0.16) (0.23) (0.25) (0.32) (0.28) (0.37)
Age 25–34 0.96** −0.63** 0.90** −0.60** 0.35 −0.50* 0.28 −0.40
(0.14) (0.18) (0.15) (0.19) (0.24) (0.28) (0.27) (0.32)
Age 35–49 0.54** −0.29* 0.53** −0.26 0.09 −0.34 0.01 −0.38
(0.14) (0.17) (0.15) (0.18) (0.24) (0.26) (0.27) (0.30)
Age 50–64 0.19 −0.23 0.22 −0.17 −0.06 −0.30 −0.17 −0.44
(0.15) (0.17) (0.16) (0.18) (0.26) (0.27) (0.29) (0.32)
Lower middle class −0.13 −0.10 −0.08 −0.07 −0.46* −0.20 −0.47* −0.09
(0.12) (0.16) (0.12) (0.16) (0.24) (0.27) (0.26) (0.30)
Skilled working class −0.16 −0.41** −0.14 −0.33* −0.23 −0.44 0.23 −0.39
(0.13) (0.18) (0.13) (0.19) (0.24) (0.29) (0.27) (0.33)
Unskilled working class −0.03 −0.37* −0.02 −0.28 −0.36 −0.21 −0.39 −0.17
(0.13) (0.19) (0.14) (0.20) (0.25) (0.30) (0.27) (0.33)
Farmer −0.32* −0.05 −0.24 0.07 −0.45 −0.07 −0.96* 0.41
(0.19) (0.24) (0.19) (0.24) (0.37) (0.42) (0.52) (0.49)
Secondary education 0.09 0.03 0.16 −0.06 −0.21 0.02 −0.15 −0.08
(0.14) (0.21) (0.15) (0.22) (0.24) (0.31) (0.28) (0.36)
Third level education 0.05 0.10 0.13 −0.03 −0.25 0.38 −0.11 −0.01
(0.16) (0.24) (0.16) (0.25) (0.28) (0.35) (0.32) (0.40)
Objective knowl. EU −0.35** 0.31** −0.29** 0.19 −0.08 0.32* 0.10 0.10
(0.08) (0.12) (0.08) (0.12) (0.14) (0.17) (0.15) (0.19)
Subjective knowl. EU −0.18* 0.02 −0.15* −0.06 −0.31* 0.41* −0.16 0.26
(0.09) (0.13) (0.09) (0.14) (0.19) (0.21) (0.21) (0.24)
Subjective knowl. Treaty −1.14** 0.46** −1.12** 0.51** −0.98** −0.30 −1.15** −0.31
(0.10) (0.13) (0.10) (0.13) (0.18) (0.21) (0.20) (0.24)
Own econ. situation bad −0.38** −0.31** 0.09 0.16
(0.12) (0.12) (0.16) (0.18)
Econ. prosp. improved −0.44** −0.47** 1.82** 1.53**
(0.20) (0.21) (0.18) (0.20)
Econ. prosp. disimproved 0.75** 0.73** −0.94** −0.41
(0.11) (0.11) (0.26) (0.30)
Dissatisfaction government 0.20** −0.65** 0.16** −0.55** −0.26 −0.47* −0.13 −0.36
(0.07) (0.11) (0.07) (0.11) (0.19) (0.25) (0.21) (0.27)
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Table 2. (Cont.) Logistic random utility regressions (Sattler & Urpelainen, 2012) explaining vote choice in the 2008 and
2009 Lisbon referendums in Ireland.
2008 2009
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Cost Utility Cost Utility Cost Utility Cost Utility
Fine Gael 0.08 −0.28* 0.06 −0.30* −0.02 −0.34 −0.15 −0.25
(0.12) (0.15) (0.12) (0.16) (0.23) (0.25) (0.26) (0.28)
Sinn Fein 0.26 −1.08** 0.27 −0.92** 0.25 −0.96** −0.01 −0.85**
(0.17) (0.29) (0.17) (0.31) (0.31) (0.36) (0.34) (0.40)
Labour −0.01 −0.35* 0.07 −0.44** −0.13 −0.84** −0.28 −0.64**
(0.15) (0.20) (0.14) (0.21) (0.25) (0.25) (0.27) (0.29)
Green Party 0.03 −0.52* −0.07 −0.45 0.73** −1.00 0.73** −0.88*
(0.23) (0.28) (0.23) (0.28) (0.31) (0.43) (0.33) (0.48)
Other −0.19 −0.86** −0.14 −0.86** 0.14 −0.61 −0.36 −0.63
(0.24) (0.28) (0.23) (0.30) (0.34) (0.43) (0.42) (0.50)
No party 0.29** −0.72** 0.25** −0.77** 0.29 −0.70** 0.20 −0.57**
(0.09) (0.13) (0.09) (0.13) (0.18) (0.21) (0.20) (0.24)
Irish identity 0.10 −0.45** 0.07 −0.26** −0.03 −0.63** −0.18 −0.49**
(0.07) (0.11) (0.07) (0.11) (0.13) (0.16) (0.15) (0.18)
Anti-immigration −0.39** 0.20
(0.11) (0.18)
EU memb. is a good thing −0.31** 0.69** −0.37** 1.85**
(0.08) (0.15) (0.16) (0.22)
Pro-neutrality attitude 0.09 −0.63** −0.24* −0.79**
(0.07) (0.10) (0.14) (0.18)
Intercept −1.09** 0.94** −0.81** 0.24 −0.15 1.65** 0.28 0.36
(0.21) (0.27) (0.22) (0.31) (0.41) (0.49) (0.46) (0.57)
N 1917 1804 905 811
AIC 3411.2 3162.5 1501.0 1229.2
Notes: * p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05. Standard errors in parentheses. Cost is modelled with a dummy for abstention as dependent variable;
utility with a dummy variable for a ‘yes’ vote as dependent variable.
there was a positive link between voting ‘yes’ and Ire-
land’s economic prospects. Those who expect a ‘no’ vote
to disimprove Irish’ economic prospects weremore likely
to vote ‘yes’ in 2008 and in 2009 those who expect a ‘yes’
vote to improve Irish’ economic prospects were strongly
inclined to support the Treaty. Those who thought eco-
nomic prospects would worsen were slightly more likely
to vote ‘no’. While the change in sign is a direct result of
the changed question wording, there is also a clearly visi-
ble change in effect magnitude, which shows the impact
of the changed economic context in which the referen-
dum took place.6 Figure 1 provides a visualisation of the
main effect, showing how pocketbook voting (comparing
the ‘own economic situation is good’ to the ‘own eco-
nomic situation is bad’ column) mattered clearly in 2008,
but much less so in 2009, where the two columns are
near-identical. For sociotropic voting, on the other hand
(comparing the rows of the figure), we do see strong
effects in both years, but particularly in 2009. This pro-
vides strong and statistically significant support for H4.
While the effectwas significant in 2008, themagnitude of
the coefficient is statistically significantly larger in 2009.
This implies the economic panic argument—that voters
switched their vote between 2008 and 2009 because
of the GFC, has some weight to it, evidence again that
context is crucial in determining the economic motiva-
tions of vote choice. More interestingly, sociotropic util-
ity is consistently important in shaping referendum vote
choice, in line with the literature that sociotropic utility
is a more consistent predictor of vote choice.
6. Conclusion
The two Irish referendums on the Lisbon Treaty, either
side of the onset of the GFC, offer an ideal opportunity
to explore economic voting in referendums and to es-
tablish whether and in what circumstances sociotropic
or egocentric utility drives vote choice. Our study shows
that voter’s economic perceptions mattered in both ref-
erendums. In both referendums, sociotropic motivations
6 In the Appendix in Table A1 we provide results using conventional logistic regressions instead of the model specification proposed by Sattler and
Urpelainen (2012). Overall results are similar, but for the impact of economic prospects, we do not find as strong results in 2008—we nevertheless
confirm the stark difference between 2008 and 2009, in the same direction.
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Figure 1. Predicted probabilities based on Model 6 and Model 8, keeping all other independent variables at the mode for
categorical variables, based on the 2008 data set, and at zero for the standardized scale variables.
were important, with its effect larger in the 2009 refer-
endum post the onset of the GFC. Meanwhile, egocen-
tric utility was more important in 2008 when particu-
lar groups, adversely impact by globalization, and voters
who perceived the EU as not having a positive influence
on their personal economic situation were more likely
to vote against the Treaty. In 2009 however, the egocen-
tric economic evaluation was not a significant factor and
while certain groups of voters were still more likely to
vote against the Lisbon Treaty, thus offering some sup-
port for the utilitarian view, egocentric considerations
were less important in 2009 compared with 2008. This
highlights the important role of context—in a different
economic environment, voters’ economic calculations
shift, where in times of crisis, sociotropic became even
more important and egocentric considerations less so.
While our study of two subsequent referendums on
the same Treaty, in the same country, under the same
government, provides a unique opportunity to investi-
gate this dynamic, we recognize the second referendum
might have been too soon after the onset of the eco-
nomic crisis. The role of the EU in the resolution to the
crisis only became visible in the years after the referen-
dum. We recognize that some scholars suggest that the
initial years of the GFC did not have a significant impact
on Euroscepticism but rather the latter years.
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Appendix
This Appendix provides additional robustness checks evaluating ourmain findings.Whileweopt for a regressionmodel that
simultaneously incorporates the decision to vote and the vote choice, which we consider mutually dependent decisions,
the more conventional approach is to run separate binomial regressions with either turnout (or abstention) or vote as
dependent variable. Table A1 provides these in the form of logistic regressions, explaining abstention and the ‘yes’ vote,
respectively, for the 2008 and 2009 referendums. Furthermore, Table A1 replicates the full model specification for 2009 in
the article,Model 8,with one additional variable—attitude towards further European integration—whichwas not available
in the 2008 data set, and therefore left out of the article.
A further extension evaluates more in depth the interaction between party preference and sociotropic or pocketbook
voting, using interaction variables between all party dummies and all economic variables in the model (cf. Hicks, Milner,
& Tingley, 2014). These results are presented in Table A2. While results are weaker due to the many variables in the
model, overall findings remain the same, and we find limited evidence of interaction effects. Party preference does affect
sociotropic voting in the 2009 referendum, but not to such an extent that it changes our main findings—even for those
parties where sociotropic voting is weakest (Fine Gael, Labour), the effect is still positive and statistically significant.
Table A1. Logistic regressions explaining vote choice in the 2009 Lisbon referendum in Ireland, evaluating motivations
behind economic voting.
2009 2008 2009
Model 8 with unification Model 9a Model 9b Model 10a Model 10b
Cost Utility Abstention Yes vote Abstention Yes vote
Female −0.16 0.10 −0.10
(0.18) (0.15) (0.26)
Age 18–24 0.48 −0.62 1.58** −0.56 1.23** −0.70
(0.30) (0.40) (0.25) (0.34) (0.41) (0.58)
Age 25–34 0.24 −0.47 1.28** −0.67** 0.76** −0.23
(0.28) (0.34) (0.22) (0.28) (0.38) (0.49)
Age 35–49 −0.01 −0.26 0.74** −0.42* 0.24 −0.53
(0.28) (0.33) (0.22) (0.25) (0.37) (0.45)
Age 50–64 −0.16 −0.33 0.31 −0.30 0.08 −0.61
(0.31) (0.34) (0.22) (0.25) (0.38) (0.47)
Lower middle class −0.40 0.02 −0.10 −0.21 −0.51 −0.29
(0.26) (0.31) (0.19) (0.23) (0.34) (0.42)
Skilled working class −0.26 −0.33 −0.27 −0.47* −0.07 −0.70
(0.28) (0.34) (0.21) (0.27) (0.36) (0.46)
Unskilled working class −0.39 −0.14 −0.14 −0.48* −0.49 −0.37
(0.28) (0.34) (0.22) (0.29) (0.37) (0.46)
Farmer −1.35∗ 0.65 −0.46 0.12 −1.50** 0.80
(0.71) (0.54) (0.29) (0.35) (0.64) (0.70)
Secondary education −0.23 0.04 0.22 −0.14 −0.63 −0.10
(0.29) (0.38) (0.24) (0.31) (0.40) (0.55)
Third level education −0.12 0.13 0.25 −0.03 −0.54 0.08
(0.32) (0.42) (0.27) (0.35) (0.45) (0.61)
Objective knowl. EU 0.06 0.14 −0.37** 0.37** −0.07 0.12
(0.16) (0.20) (0.13) (0.18) (0.22) (0.27)
Subjective knowl. EU −0.06 0.21 −0.30** 0.04 −0.38 0.54
(0.22) (0.25) (0.15) (0.20) (0.28) (0.35)
Subjective knowl. Treaty −1.11 −0.15 −1.71** 0.71** −1.55** −0.90**
(0.22) (0.26) (0.15) (0.20) (0.28) (0.37)
Own econ. situation bad 0.27 −0.49** 0.07
(0.20) (0.20) (0.27)
Econ. prosp. improved 1.60** −0.46 2.17**
(0.22) (0.35) (0.31)
Econ. prosp. disimproved −0.52 1.24** −0.62
(0.32) (0.17) (0.46)
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Table A1. (Cont.) Logistic regressions explaining vote choice in the 2009 Lisbon referendum in Ireland, evaluating motiva-
tions behind economic voting.
2009 2008 2009
Model 8 with unification Model 9a Model 9b Model 10a Model 10b
Cost Utility Abstention Yes vote Abstention Yes vote
Dissatisfaction government −0.24 −0.45 0.14 −0.84** 0.12 −0.66
(0.22) (0.29) (0.12) (0.16) (0.29) (0.42)
Fine Gael −0.18 −0.08 0.09 −0.50** −0.10 −0.66
(0.28) (0.31) (0.19) (0.22) (0.33) (0.41)
Sinn Fein 0.15 −0.60 0.24 −1.57** 0.05 −1.07*
(0.36) (0.44) (0.28) (0.50) (0.47) (0.60)
Labour −0.30 −0.41 0.02 −0.68** −0.09 −0.66
(0.28) (0.31) (0.23) (0.29) (0.34) (0.44)
Green Party 0.75** −0.77 0.06 −0.64 1.14** −1.14
(0.35) (0.52) (0.34) (0.40) (0.50) (0.77)
Other −0.39 −0.48 −0.40 −1.40** −0.22 −1.00
(0.46) (0.54) (0.34) (0.41) (0.61) (0.79)
No party 0.29 −0.45* 0.27* −1.06** 0.53** −0.77**
(0.21) (0.25) (0.14) (0.19) (0.27) (0.36)
Irish identity −0.21 −0.52** 0.05 −0.38** −0.09 −0.88**
(0.16) (0.20) (0.12) (0.16) (0.21) (0.27)
Anti-immigration 0.65** −0.62** 0.19
(0.21) (0.18) (0.27)
EU memb. is a good thing −0.52** 1.91** −0.09 1.10** −0.33 2.70**
(0.18) (0.25) (0.14) (0.24) (0.22) (0.33)
Pro-neutrality attitude −0.16 −0.70** −0.19 −0.95** −0.23 −0.89**
(0.15) (0.19) (0.12) (0.15) (0.20) (0.26)
Anti-unification attitude −0.05 −0.97**
(0.15) (0.20)
Intercept 0.58 −0.09 −1.78** 0.11 −1.02* 0.49
(0.47) (0.61) (0.34) (0.44) (0.62) (0.85)
N 743 1861 1212 852 642
AIC 1095.8 1963.0 1205.0 762.0 496.0
Notes: * p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05. Standard errors in parentheses. For the expanded Model 8, the logistic random utility model of Sattler
and Urpelainen (2012) is used, with the attitude against further integration added as an additional control, which is unavailable in the
2008 data. For the remaining model, regular logistic regression is used, separately modelling abstention and vote choice.
Table A2. Logistic regressions explaining vote choice in the 2008 and 2009 Lisbon referendums in Ireland, including inter-
actions between party choice and economic variables.
2008 2009
Model 11 Model 12
Cost Utility Cost Utility
Female −0.01 −0.18
(0.10) (0.17)
Age 18–24 0.93** −0.36 0.53* −0.68*
(0.16) (0.23) (0.28) (0.38)
Age 25–34 0.89** −0.61** 0.26 −0.39
(0.15) (0.20) (0.27) (0.32)
Age 35–49 0.52** −0.29 −0.02 −0.35
(0.15) (0.18) (0.27) (0.31)
Age 50–64 0.20 −0.18 −0.20 −0.43
(0.16) (0.18) (0.29) (0.32)
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Table A2. (Cont.) Logistic regressions explaining vote choice in the 2008 and 2009 Lisbon referendums in Ireland, including
interactions between party choice and economic variables.
2008 2009
Model 11 Model 12
Cost Utility Cost Utility
Lower middle class −0.07 −0.09 −0.49* −0.16
(0.12) (0.16) (0.26) (0.30)
Skilled working class −0.13 −0.32* −0.24 −0.37
(0.13) (0.19) (0.27) (0.33)
Unskilled working class 0.00 −0.30 −0.41 −0.17
(0.14) (0.20) (0.27) (0.34)
Farmer −0.22 0.04 −0.98* 0.55
(0.19) (0.25) (0.51) (0.50)
Secondary education 0.17 −0.06 −0.15 −0.24
(0.15) (0.22) (0.28) (0.37)
Third level education 0.13 −0.04 −0.12 −0.14
(0.16) (0.25) (0.32) (0.41)
Objective knowl. EU −0.30** 0.19 0.11 0.11
(0.08) (0.13) (0.15) (0.19)
Subjective knowl. EU −0.16* −0.04 −0.14 0.25
(0.09) (0.14) (0.21) (0.24)
Subjective knowl. Treaty −1.11** 0.50** −1.16** −0.26
(0.10) (0.14) (0.20) (0.24)
Own econ. situation bad −0.26 0.02
(0.22) (0.40)
× Fine Gael −0.04 −0.42
(0.37) (0.57)
× Sinn Fein −0.35 0.45
(0.54) (0.86)
× Labour −0.11 −0.03
(0.45) (0.61)
× Green Party 0.86 0.59
(0.82) (1.03)
× Other 0.25 1.47
(0.59) (0.19)
× No party −0.20 −0.34
(0.29) (0.49)
Econ. prosp. improved −0.62 2.40**
(0.41) (0.47)
× Fine Gael −0.24 −1.43**
(0.63) (0.65)
× Sinn Fein 1.39 −1.44
(1.56) (1.01)
× Labour 0.39 −1.21*
(0.67) (0.68)
× Green Party 1.38 −0.07
(1.73) (1.25)
× Other 0.81 0.94
(1.01) (1.59)
× No party 0.18 −0.96
(0.58) (0.60)
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Table A2. (Cont.) Logistic regressions explaining vote choice in the 2008 and 2009 Lisbon referendums in Ireland, including
interactions between party choice and economic variables.
2008 2009
Model 11 Model 12
Cost Utility Cost Utility
Econ. prosp. disimproved 0.87∗∗ −0.03
(0.19) (0.73)
× Fine Gael 0.25 −0.23
(0.35) (0.98)
× Sinn Fein −1.72** −1.03
(0.62) (1.21)
× Labour 0.04 0.60
(0.51) (0.96)
× Green Party 0.20 −1.41
(0.69) (2.25)
× Other −1.59∗∗ 0.61
(0.62) (1.29)
× No party −0.16 −1.71*
(0.28) (1.00)
Dissatisfaction government 0.15** −0.55** −0.18 −0.34
(0.07) (0.11) (0.21) (0.28)
Fine Gael 0.09 −0.34 −0.23 0.43
(0.13) (0.22) (0.26) (0.47)
Sinn Fein 0.28 −0.41 −0.09 0.61
(0.18) (0.39) (0.35) (0.68)
Labour 0.06 −0.44* −0.38 −0.33
(0.15) (0.26) (0.27) (0.53)
Green Party −0.08 −0.65* 0.80** −1.07
(0.23) (0.34) (0.39) (0.75)
Other −0.17 −0.50 −0.20 −2.06*
(0.23) (0.44) (0.43) (1.22)
No party 0.25** −0.68** 0.16 −0.38
(0.09) (0.17) (0.20) (0.36)
Irish identity 0.06 −0.24** −0.18 −0.56**
(0.07) (0.11) (0.15) (0.19)
Anti-immigration −0.39** 0.25
(0.11) (0.19)
EU memb. is a good thing −0.32** 0.72** −0.37** 1.88**
(0.08) (0.16) (0.16) (0.23)
Pro-neutrality attitude 0.10 −0.64** −0.23* −0.75**
(0.07) (0.10) (0.14) (0.18)
Intercept −0.80** 0.17 0.43 0.28
(0.22) (0.32) (0.46) (0.61)
N 1804 811
AIC 3171.9 1245.4
Notes: * p≤ 0.10; ** p≤ 0.05. Standard errors in parentheses. Cost is modelled with a dummy for abstention as the dependent variable;
utility with a dummy variable for a ‘yes’ vote as dependent variable.
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